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Because of these added layers of protection, attackers tend to opt for the path of least resistance to get their malicious code running via the kernel layer or even lower levels. Malicious actors who are actively seeking high-privilege access to Windows operating systems use techniques that attempt to combat the increased protection that endpoint protection platform (EPP) and endpoint detection and response (EDR) technologies provide users and processes. The newly signed rootkit shares numerous functions that are identical to those found in FiveSys, such as hooking the file system functions, and the pre-create mini-filter function (Figure 44).The primary purpose of the FiveSys rootkit is to monitor and redirect web traffic, but this functionality has evolved and can now be found in the newly signed rootkit, indicating advancements in its capabilities.

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Additionally, they both have the capability to install a custom root certificate to redirect HTTPS traffic.

Both the FiveSys rootkit and the second stage of the signed rootkit are functionality focused on redirecting web browsing traffic to a custom proxy server controlled by the attacker.

There are similarities in the C&C infrastructure used by both FiveSys and the newly signed drivers.

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Upon analysis, we have discovered that the drivers and the well-known FiveSys rootkit exhibit numerous similarities in terms of functionality, code similarity, infrastructure, and victimology: It first disables the anti-spyware detection from the registry key “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender” (Figure 30), disables the “SecurityHealthService” service (Figure 31), and stops antivirus checks (Figure 32).

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The main objective of this driver is to stop Windows Defender software.

The shutdown routine will read itself from registry, write itself back to disk, and creates a service that starts the next time the system reboots.

Before rebooting, the first-stage shutdown notification routine is executed.

Then, the first-stage and second-stage drivers are only present in memory.

The second-stage driver reads the first-stage driver from disk and write it to registry, then deletes it from disk.

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The first-stage driver connects to C&C sever to download second-stage driver.The detailed analysis for this specific second stage plug-in is as follows: This technique, combined with the downloaded kernel plug-in from the C&C server, will be the main persistence mechanism for this driver. The first stage alongside the second stage (the plug-in downloaded from the C&C server) work together as part of the attackers’ self-protection and persistence method. Finally, it creates a service with the name “BaohuName” that will run when the system starts again. It also checks the registry key “ \Registry\Machine\Software\PtMyMem” if it presents, then it iterates on all its subkeys and decodes the data, writing it to the disk with the “ C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\687ae09e.sys” path. The first-stage shutdown notification function checks if a kernel plug-in has been received and loaded in memory from the C&C server for cleanup purposes. The found variants are composed of eight main clusters based on the extracted vendor specific metadata from the SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO fields in the signatures ( Authenticode) revealed various publishers that these variants signed on their behalf (Figure 1). Each plug-in has a specific set of actions to be carried out from the kernel space. Each second-stage plug-in is customized to the victim machine it’s deployed on, with some containing even a custom compiled driver for each machine. The main binary acts as a universal loader that allows the attackers to directly load a second-stage unsigned kernel module. We reported our findings to Microsoft's Security Response Center (MSRC) in June 2023. Their malware seems to have passed through the Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) process for getting a valid signature. This malicious actor originates from China and their main victims are the gaming sector in China. However, this turned out to be a novel piece of a signed rootkit that communicates with a large command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure for an unknown threat actor that we are currently tracking and that we believe that is the same threat actor behind the rootkit FiveSys. In one of our recent threat hunting investigations, we came across an interesting new threat activity cluster that we initially thought was a false positive detection for a Microsoft signed file.